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A.N. GOSTEV, T.S. DEMCHENKO, AND E.A. BORISOVA

Corruption in the System of Higher Education

Problems and Ways to Prevent Them

On the basis of an analysis of the literature, social practice, and the results of a concrete sociological survey, the article examines the main problems of education in Russia today, the ways they are conditioned by corruption, and possible solutions.

Corruption is a phenomenon that is objective and international. There is not a single country, nor could there be, that has not experienced corruption. As A.G. Lukashenko (the president of Belarus, a country in which corruption is not rampant) put it vividly everyone is equally making pigs of themselves at the public trough: whether they are reds, whites, greens, blues, Germans, English, or . . . There can be no question that this is a negative phenomenon. Strange as it may seem, however,

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Translated by Kim Braithwaite.

corruption does contain much that is positive, because it gives rise to a contradiction that consists of conflict between the forces of good and evil, and the process by which the contradiction is resolved is what drives progress. It is an indicator that rates the competence, viability, and honesty of the ruling authorities. There can be no question that corruption and associated phenomena activate the electoral behavior of the population; evidence is provided by the increasingly frequent mass protest movements that took place during the election campaigns of 2012 and 2013.

In this connection it is reasonable to ask: "Why is the level of corruption low in some countries and high in others?" It is well known that one aspect that distinguishes a human being from an ant or a bee is that before he starts to build a house he creates a model of it in his head. The hands that take bribes are the task performers; the head provides the inspiration. A state is a living organism and has a "brain." In response to the question posed about corruption levels, there is one answer: the incompetence and dysfunctionality of the state apparatus. It is not appropriate to make reference to some special mentality of the people of Russia and the wide prevalence of stories of how lazy they are, unwilling to oppose evil. It is well known that if a state employee does not have his "hand in the cookie jar" and is not making a pig of himself within sight of the Fatherland's treasury, then he will not pay attention to those stories and he will be able to organize successful efforts to combat corruption; this has been proved by experience in this country and abroad.

What makes corruption socially dangerous is that it destabilizes the work of public institutions, diminishes the level of national security, and provides fertile soil for political, economic, educational, social, psychological, and other subversive actions. At the present time, for example, the state has been forced to conduct preventive measures against 654 nonprofit organizations that are operating on the fertile soil of Russia and are being financed from abroad. Of course their activity is linked to the easy possibility of bribing members of the state apparatus and engaging in unlawful operations, in relative safety. For some reason, many crooks who skipped out of the country are suddenly

starting to love Russia and are even prepared to suffer in order to make their way back.

Corruption poses a special danger in the sphere of education. As is well known, active measures to implement the agreement for Russia to become a part of the Bologna process got started after Russia received (through a nonprofit organization) a \$5 billion “grant” from George Soros, the American philanthropist. What became of that tranche? And how come it became so generous all at once? Hasn’t it been used to implement Allen Dulles’s well-known program to destroy Russia? In that program we read: “We will create chaos and confusion in the administration of the state. We will inconspicuously but actively and constantly foster the petty tyranny of bureaucrats, bribe takers, and the unprincipled. . . . In this way we will undermine one generation after another. We will start in on people when they are children and young adults, we will place our bets on the young people, we will subvert, debauch, and corrupt them. . . .” [1].

The provisions of this document are being implemented successfully: the Soviet Union has been destroyed; chaos reigns in the state administration of Russia, in the same way that “popular fronts” are created in a war; the younger generation has been lost; the older generation has been humbled and impoverished; and the nation’s wealth is being plundered and carted off to the West. And of course, Russia’s bureaucrats have not been deprived. Excellent conditions have been set up for them abroad so that they can create launching sites from which to get out of Russia.

For the purpose of combating this vice, all countries in the world, in accordance with the basic law governing the administration of society (actualized social need requires the creation of a special institution to meet that need), specialized (enforcement and security) structures (institutions) have been set up. Consequently the frequency and intensiveness of acts of corruption are due to flaws in the system and the mechanisms of these organizations.

Here is the definition of corruption as spelled out in Russian Federation Law No. 273-FZ dated 25 December 2008, “On

Opposing Corruption”: it is a crime that involves an official’s use of the rights that are linked to his position “contrary to the legal interests of society and the state for the purpose of obtaining benefits in the form of money, assets, and other property or services of a proprietary character, or other rights of property for oneself or for third persons, or the illegal provision of such benefits to said official by other physical persons” [6].

Education and science are becoming a “field of miracles,” a profitable industry for thieving bureaucrats.

Today, Karl Marx’s *Das Kapital* has become a desk reference for any successful entrepreneur, and it ranks only behind the Bible in terms of the number of copies that are circulating in the world. In this connection, the “managers” of the system of education ought to know this quotation from that classic: “Provide capital with a 10 percent profit, and it will agree to any use; at 20 percent it will become lively; at 50 percent it is positively willing to rack its brains; at 100 percent it will trample on all human laws; and at 300 percent there is no crime that it will not be willing to risk except for fear of the gallows” [3, p. 321]. Long before Marx, Russia’s entrepreneurs knew this truth: “What cannot be bought for money can be bought for ‘a whole lot of money.’ Money will buy deputy seats in the Duma, jobs, academic degrees, and other trappings; in other words, corruption has become a kind of business.”

As has been shown by the results of many surveys, the annual circulation of money involved in corruption in this country’s system of education comes to as much as forty-five billion rubles [2]. Of course these data are far from accurate, and there is no question that they are understated, because corruption has become a traditional phenomenon in the structures of all levels of education and science. There are all kinds of evidence for this. It is sufficient to mention facts such as complaints by law enforcement agencies against the financial activity of the most well-known institutions of higher learning (MEI [Moscow Institute of Economics], RGGU [Russian State University of the Humanities], GUU [the State University of Management], MISiS [Moscow University of Technology], and others), dismissals and arrests of rectors and vice rectors, searches of

the offices of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, the “regalia” of Russian Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member B.A. Berezovskii (who, according to testimony given by A.E. Khinshtein, a deputy to the State Duma of the Council of the Federation of the Russian Federation, was given that title in exchange for twenty-seven Zhiguli cars), and a number of others.

Corruption is becoming customary for a substantial number of participants in the educational process. For example, the results of an empirical survey (with clusters of four higher educational institutions, a sample consisting of 400 people, with a sampling error of 5 percent, and sample indicators consisting of profession, job position, sex, and age) showed that 47 percent of the respondents had taken part in corruption dealings (accepting a dacha or a bribe); 27 percent had not taken part in that phenomenon but had witnessed such cases; and 26 percent did not give an answer. In addition, 58 percent have a negative attitude toward corruption, while 14 percent have a positive attitude, 13 percent are indifferent toward it, and 15 percent did not give an answer.

Analysis of current social practice provides evidence that the higher the level of ruling authority is the greater the level of crookedness, incompetence, corruption, and thievery. There are two obvious and basic causes of the existence of this phenomenon. The first is that the healthy forces of society are being squeezed out of their environment by “foreign bodies” that are distinguished from them by their manner of behavior and their upbringing, by their finely tuned sophistication and their “natural propensity” to engage in fraud and money grubbing. When there are a lot of “specimens” like these “at the top,” they begin to interact with each other and enter into relations based on [common] interests, to lobby for and promote the team principle of administration, to set up criminal gangs and legalize them, and to draw up “odd” recommendations for lower levels of administration (see further below). The result is chaos, poverty, and social tension down below; there is team solidarity, super incomes, laxity, a loss of any sense of danger, and arrogance up above.

The second cause is the low level of development of the system and mechanisms of social control, due to the special frame of mind of the Russian individual and the psychology of our people, which serve as the basis for the formation of qualities and properties of the population such as toleration (tolerance), alienation from ruling authority, ignoring the laws, and so on.

In such a case, ruling authority loses the foundation needed for its activity; it “saws off the branch it is sitting on.”

Practice has shown that given the apathy of participants in the educational process such as college students, their parents, and employers, efforts to combat corruption in the system of education are headed by the system’s own bureaucrats. But many of them cannot do this, *a priori*, because they have a material interest in maintaining it. For example, a number of administrators of state institutions of higher learning have private nonstate colleges and universities; there are some rectors who make as much as one and a half million rubles every month. For example, according to official data the average monthly pay of the rector of the Saint Petersburg Mining Institute came to 703,600 rubles; the pay of the rector of Russian State Social University came to 579,400 rubles; that of the rector of the Russian Plekhanov University of Economics came to more than 400,000 rubles. By way of comparison, the official salary of a minister of the Russian Federation comes to about 150,000 rubles; that of the president of the Russian Federation is about 240,000 rubles.

Judging from the results of an investigation by journalists in Moscow, the administration of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation is not doing much to put a stop to it. Staffers of the ministry’s press service state that “a rector’s income is a matter of confidential information of a personal character.” That answer might be a reasonable one in regard to the rector of a private institution of higher learning, but the administrator of a state educational institution is dealing with budget money, so there should be no secret in this regard.

It would appear that, very possibly, the control and monitoring bodies of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation have understated the level of motivation for such

activity, because corruption in the sphere of licensing, certification, and accreditation is given quite a high ranking by the experts: “the licensing of one specialty is worth \$50,000 to \$150,000 and between 200,000 and 500,000 rubles; a higher educational institution’s accreditation is worth between \$300,000 and \$1.5 million” [5]. Of course this money is not being appropriated on the level of the institution.

It is hard to understand what their attitude is toward direct instructions from the country’s top official. For example, at a meeting with rectors of Russia’s institutions of higher learning, V.V. Putin said that he had “questions about the difference between the salary earned by a rector and that of a member of the corps of professors and instructors, by factors of five, ten . . . and even fifteen!” And he advised the administrators of higher educational institutions to “bring their salaries more into line with those of instructors.”

In that case it is reasonable to ask: Why are “the people” keeping silent, that is, those who represent the “social base”? The results of the survey conducted in the higher educational institutions of Moscow (see above) show that while a majority of professors, instructors, and students are aware of the unquestionable harm done by corruption in the system of education and the need to combat it, they exhibit passivity, and, if they do get caught in a trap of corruption, they prefer to act in accordance with the established stereotypes, namely by giving a bribe or a little gift, providing a service, and so on. It is instructive to look at the results of the survey of professors and instructors ($N = 55$). In response to the question “How often have you been offered a ‘token of gratitude’ that might be considered a bribe?”, twenty-six respondents answered that it averaged at least two times per month; twelve said it happened once a month; and seventeen found it difficult to answer.

And the greater the number of people who “get their hands dirty” in relations of corruption, the more difficult it is to resolve conflicts of corruption; there is less use of methods of compromise to settle things and more use of strong-arm methods.

In the higher educational institutions today there persists the tradition of personnel not being involved in making the most important management decisions. Quite often, people do not know what their rights are, or any possibilities of influencing the institution's authorities, and therefore they prefer to remain passive. One reason for this appears to be the lack of transparency in the financing of education, in other words the flows of money.

It is well known that *glasnost* [openness] is one of the principles necessary to encourage a person to work effectively. *Glasnost* is a very important element in the organization of people's participation in competitions of work activity. In the Soviet Union, for example, there was a mass movement of blue-collar workers, *kolkhoz* [collective-farm] members, and engineering and technical workers who overfulfilled their established norms of production by many times. That movement was the consequence of the propaganda of the labor feats of A.G. Stakhanov and the whole set of Soviet benefits given to him. In this connection, keeping confidential the information about wages and salaries of fellow workers does a great deal of social and psychological harm. It causes workers to distrust their superiors; it causes people not to want to take initiative; it reduces the level of competition in the collectives of the institution; it generates an atmosphere of conflict and creates the conditions for intrigue and toadyism.

The survey of instructors in four state institutions of higher learning in Moscow ($N = 55$) showed that all of them do not possess information about the salaries earned by their colleagues. This is also a sly move. It is a well-known technique of persons engaged in corruption: in order to discourage protest activity all it takes is to win over the referent group or its leader. That's all it takes! Then you can easily steal without having to hide out and you can just take your ease in the wilderness of the homeland of your forefathers, which is what Russia's oligarchs do, while making a big show out of it and not caring at all about public opinion, the impoverished condition of the bulk of the population, the law enforcement agencies, and the state authorities.

That is why the level of efforts to combat manifestations of corruption in most higher educational institutions of Russia is so low; practically no efforts of this kind are being made because the active portion of the protest contingent has been removed (through bribery) from the battle.

In this connection, the proposal by the leadership of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation regarding special pay for instructors seems “well founded,” but apparently it is completely out of step with the provisions of Federal Law No. 273-FZ, “On Education in the Russian Federation,” where it states clearly that “from the day that the present Federal Law goes into effect, the salaries (salaries of position) for the positions of scientific pedagogical workers of educational organizations of higher education shall include amounts of extra pay for academic degrees, and in accordance with the positions that were in effect up to the day that the present Federal Law went into effect, taking account of the academic degrees that are required for the corresponding positions.” The drafters acted “wisely.” “The present Federal Law shall go into effect from 1 September 2013, with the exception of the provisions for which the present article has set different dates that they are to go into effect.” During the period “prior to going into effect” from 29 December 2012 through 1 September 2013, they changed and will still change in accordance with the procedure governing the issuance of extra pay for academic degrees and for positions.

Clearly the Russian Federation president’s demand that “the salaries of rectors be brought more into line with those of instructors” is being carried out. For example, one associate in the Ministry of Education and Science states that “in the future the decision as to whether to issue extra pay for an academic degree and an academic rank, and its amount, will be made by the leaders of the institution of higher learning or the institute.” And a bureaucrat in the financial and economic section of the government of the Russian Federation makes no secret of the fact that “for the administration of a higher educational institution it serves as an instrument by which to reward those whom the

leaders consider to be effective workers and to compel the rest to resign.”

Of course such a system of pay for professors and instructors worsens the corruption. A person who has better relations with the administration is going to receive larger monetary compensation. In part, of course, it is the leaders of protest groups that will be financed. Already, now, the new idea of “motivating the work” has led to protest among the corps of instructors, but, of course, the bureaucrats like it. For example, N.N. Kudriavtsev, the rector of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, stated with a note of optimism that “eliminating extra pay for academic degrees will bring about an increase in the motivation/incentive fund.” It is the departments that dispense the salary fund, he says; as a rule, decisions regarding rewards are made collectively, and for this reason he does not anticipate any special biases when it comes to calculating extra pay. But does this bureaucrat know about actual institutional practice, which is where he worked before he was appointed to this position? It may be that he does know, if, all of a sudden, his salary after the idea is carried out rises substantially—which ought to be inevitable, since there is simply a huge market in which to employ one’s energies. Substantial amounts of money will come in every month and be at the disposal of the higher educational institution’s administrative apparatus. After all, the number of professors and instructors just in the higher educational institutions alone comes to 348,200 (of that number, the figure is 319,000 in state and municipal institutions and 29,200 in nonstate institutions). The total numbers of state and municipal institutions of higher learning are 634 and 446, respectively [4, p. 573].

Now we will make an approximate calculation of funds in the case of state institutions of higher learning alone, taking into account that in these institutions, as shown by the results of the survey, about 20 percent of the teaching staff consists of doctors of science (the extra pay for the academic degree and academic rank is about 15,000 rubles), and 50 percent are candidates of science (total extra pay of 7,000). Bear in mind that in accordance

with the requirements of the Federal State Education Standards of higher professional education, the percentage of instructors who have an academic degree and/or an academic rank should be *not less than 60 percent* of the total number of those involved in the educational process in accordance with the basic educational program. No less than 8 percent of instructors should hold the academic degree of doctor of science (including a degree that has been awarded abroad and has undergone the established procedure of recognition and establishment of equivalency) and/or the academic rank of professor. We will look at approximate but objective figures.

The expectable number of doctors of science is 27,800 out of 319,000 (the funds required amount to 417 million rubles); the number of candidates of science is 159,500 (1,116,500,000 rubles). Every month there is over 1.5 billion rubles “in the pot.” On average (!) a single state institution of higher learning will have a monthly “distribution fund” of about 23,659,000 rubles. For this reason it is very easy to understand the “optimism” of some rectors: the annual amount of corruption funds will grow by at least 276 million rubles (see Marx’s prophecy above). It is too bad about the rector of GUU, who was arrested over “only” 7 million rubles. The “poor guy” was a bit too hasty. In this connection, let us now turn back to the definition of corruption cited earlier: “it is a crime . . . for the purpose of obtaining a benefit in the form of money . . . for oneself or for third persons, or the illegal provision of such benefits to said official by other physical persons.” It is obvious that even honest administrators of education (of whom there are certainly many) are objectively placing themselves in situations of corruption, and they risk “falling on their face in the dirt.” “Other physical persons” (see Rector N.N. Kudriavtsev’s fervor, mentioned earlier) will necessarily share the “motivational fund” with the administrator. How are we to determine the legality of offering “benefits to third persons?” In that case it is necessary to pass a law regulating specific indicators of the services of the “third person.” Under the conditions of Russia today, when many actions of a person who provides essential services to society

have to be given incentive in that form, it is a stalemate, as in a game of chess. But while a stalemate in chess is, as a rule, a tie, in the case examined here it is a defeat for the corps of professors and instructors. And this corps, as is well known, is the main figure in education.

In the not too distant past such an experiment was conducted by the former minister of defense of the Russian Federation, now a figure in many criminal cases. He created “motivation funds” to provide incentives to the best officers in military units. And moreover it was the unit’s commanding officer who disposed of this fund. One result of this “motivation” was that the officers began to combine their military service with jobs in “companies and banks,” while the “motivators” began to work with those to whom they had paid the bonuses. And when it comes to the chief “motivator,” to this day neither the country’s procuracy nor its leaders know just where to place the “do not” part of the well-known sentence: “do not execute; pardon” versus “execute; do not pardon.”

It looks as if the current administrators of education and science do not know how to draw conclusions from the lessons of the past and the present. They do not understand the consequences of their initiatives. When it comes to the past, for example, everyone knows that the Soviet Union “fell apart” because of one leader’s incompetence or treason. But why is it that just a few people tried to prevent it? The answer is simple: the collapse had been prepared. In the mid-1980s, for example, at the initiative of the “perestroika mongers” the salary of the secretary of a raion committee of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] became smaller than that of the secretary of a *kolkhoz* party committee. The explanation was simple: the latter is working “on the land,” which is harder. As a result, genuinely industrious and honest cadres no longer moved up into higher-level jobs. The door was opened to careerists from the ranks of the Komsomol. They packed the party committees, party commissions, and divisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU; they made a mess of the work; they opened insurance companies and banks founded on party and Komsomol dues. They made their way into

the oil and gas sector. And when the Fatherland found itself in danger, they all “collectively” got out of the party.

Exactly the same scenario may play out in the case of the present regime. The signs are already visible if we look at the protest movements, which are reducing the level of trust in the United Russia Party at a rapid pace.

It is becoming essential to rationalize the selection of cadres for the state system of educational administration [8]. The current corps of cadres, as shown by an analysis of its initiatives, includes armchair administrators who are not that competent or, perhaps, are sophisticated corrupters. These latter manifest themselves, for example, when they propose adopting the indicator “foreign review of the work of a candidate for an academic degree” for the purpose of “raising the requirements on dissertation research.” The “innovators” at Moscow M.V. Lomonosov State University who are fighting for this indicator are by no means stupid. They have a “commercial streak,” and they have a reason to “roil the water.” As the folk saying has it, it is easy to catch a fish in muddy waters. But it also needs to be kept in mind that it is dangerous to swim in that kind of water, especially against the current. There are all kinds of things that the current can push back against the “swimmers.” It turned out that Moscow State University has branches in other countries. In this connection, they certainly would very much like to “strengthen” their commercial plans.

Earlier these mentors (“tutors!”) of Russian education adopted, “for their benefit,” the indicator “mandatory publication of the results of dissertation research in at least one journal that is reviewed by the Higher Certification Commission of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation.” Who was ever stopped by this indicator? How much was the quality of the dissertation research improved? A survey of thirty candidates for academic degrees showed that all of them had published articles by paying a fee—although journals reviewed by the Higher Certification Commission of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, when they receive accreditation, pledge to publish graduate students’ articles free of charge.

Only three of the respondents said that, thanks to “connections,” they have managed to get some articles published free of charge.

As a result, candidates who were honest, meaning not wealthy, faced financial obstacles on their path into science. The obvious prediction is that Moscow State University’s “innovative practice” will inevitably create fertile soil for the organization of yet more companies engaged in “handing out foreign reviews” (as in the case of many journals of the Higher Certification Commission of the Ministry of Education and Science, “companies that write dissertations”).

The result of the initiatives of these “toilers in education” is obvious: it is not people who are genuinely capable of engaging in scientific activity who will be defending their dissertations but, rather, those who have money, acquired through corruption in other spheres of activity. In the current situation it is not possible to defend one’s dissertation on the basis of money earned honestly! Proof of this is provided by a simple calculation. The average pay, even in Moscow, is about 30,000 rubles (in some regions of the country, even 10,000 rubles counts as “abundance”). Publication in a journal reviewed by the Higher Certification Commission of the Ministry of Education and Science costs an average of 10,000 rubles. In consideration of the fact that the Higher Certification Commission of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation “rendered ‘more precise’ (!!!) Russian Federation Government Decree No. 475, dated 20 June 2011, and proposed the publication of at least three articles in such publications (instead of “at least one article”), we can see why the quality of dissertation research has steadily diminished. In general, moreover, the decisions and the decrees of the government of the Russian Federation and all the other “top and bottom” bodies of administration have to be complied with. Otherwise, to put it mildly, it is not really administration, and the government is not a government.

Unfortunately, quite a few ongoing initiatives are contrary to common sense, from bureaucrats of higher educational institutions that are ranked among the top in the ratings of educational institutions. For example, they have created and are

developing the tradition of carrying out theoretical research that diminishes the study of works done in this country. The reader might ask, “What does corruption have to do with it?” The answer is “But what is the purpose of having Russian dissertations reviewed by Western scientists? Do you know what authors’ rights are?” The shelves in bookstores that carry scientific literature are sagging under the weight of books by Western researchers, the content of which contains nothing new. Who is getting the royalties? The inheritors, without question. For example, S. Freud, who was considered a charlatan by authorities of Western psychology (see Carl Jung’s opinion)—in other words, someone like our own A.M. Kashpirovskii—had six children and many grandchildren. One of his grandchildren, K. Freud, a British writer, journalist, showman, and politician, and a former deputy to parliament representing the Labor Party. Queen Elizabeth II dubbed him a knight. He has five children who are working in the mass media and in the sphere of art, and seventeen grandchildren. It is thought that they were smart enough to popularize the “odd” knowledge of their ancestor in our country and to legally “remove” quite a lot of money from Russia.

A content analysis of more than a hundred dissertation studies in the humanities, articles in ten journals reviewed by the Higher Certification Commission, Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, shows that in works of science any social phenomenon begins to be studied starting with “homilies” from Western sources. One might wonder what is so dangerous about that. But the dangers are obvious. First of all, the younger generation is not studying the achievements of the Fatherland in which they are living. Second, the prestige of Russia’s science and institutions of higher learning is falling. It is no accident that in the international ratings, our institutions of higher learning, even those that are the most highly rated (but not the best—authors’ note), are ranked at the end of a list of a thousand institutions. The fact that just one Russian institution (Moscow State University) gets a rating, ranked in fiftieth place, may be either an accident or a tribute of respect for a once-great power, or a “kickback” for propaganda in favor of Western scientific

thought. Third, as is shown by current practice, to study Russian social phenomena without taking account of the geopolitical, social, and psychological characteristics of our population, but only “adjusting” them to fit Western theories, is tantamount, a priori, to getting inaccurate results. Western conceptions are based on a different “national spirit,” a different social, religious, pedagogical, labor, and behavioral culture.

P.Ia. Chaadaev wrote: “We do not have a tradition of natural progress; everything is based on imitation and borrowing; we lack stability, orderliness, and internal unity; we live without convictions and rules.” Where has all this led our Fatherland? It has led to destruction, plundering, revolutions, and experimental territory for the practical testing of Western “innovative theories.”

As we can see, this is an age-old Russian problem. Unfortunately, it is not being properly dealt with. Nonetheless, the Westernizers, after being defeated during the Soviet period of our history, won yet another victory. It became the cause of the second collapse of a great power. Their inheritors today are the researchers who made a career in science based on translations of Western works, and who do not want to study this country’s experience. There are many well-known cases in which people have become candidates of science and, later on, doctors of science, by researching (and that is all !!!) the works of O. Spengler, E. Durkheim, S. Freud, and others. Pro-Western groups (lobbies) have been created in science, the same as, incidentally, in economics, politics, and culture. The result is that in 1991 Russia returned to the boundaries it had in the seventeenth century; its economy and education have been completely ruined; irreversible demographic processes are taking place; allies have been lost; there is chaos, corruption, anomie, and so on.

For example, at the end of the nineteenth century the territory of the Russian Empire comprised 21.8 million square kilometers (one-sixth of the Earth’s land surface). It was ranked in second place in the world, after the British Empire. That is the third in size of any of the states that ever existed. After World War II, our country’s territory added the Southern Kuriles, Transcarpathia,

and part of the territory of East Prussia. All that is left now is 17,098,246 square kilometers. Nor is it not just a matter of territory. Our countrymen live in areas that Russia has lost; they are the victims of discrimination, and, in some regions, genocide. Remaining there is a substantial portion of the productive potential that was once included in the unified national economic complex.

Another fact must be noted: when Russia was a great power, a European leader, and the victor over the France of Napoleon Bonaparte (or, more accurately, almost all of Europe, which had been mobilized by that military commander to conquer Russia), its ruble was the world's first convertible currency. Meanwhile, Germany, for example, was made up out of thirty-eight independent states. Who had the better administration?

In addition, mention must be made of the priority of many of Russia's advances in the humanities and other kinds of knowledge. It is well known, for example, that postulates of Friedrich Nietzsche's work *The Antichrist*, which are cited by our researchers, were "borrowed" from F.M. Dostoyevsky and L.N. Tolstoy. And philosophers and sociologists such as the German F. Tönnies (1855–1936) and the Frenchman E. Durkheim (1858–1917), having become acquainted with the works of N.K. Mikhailovskii (1842–1904) and N.Ia. Danilevskii (1822–1885) knew that they were "duplicating" them.

An analysis of the biographies of well-known Western scientists show that many of them lived and worked in Russia. For example, the military theoretician K. Clausewitz served in the Russian army with the rank of captain; while in the army he gathered knowledge about the victories won by Suvorov. Another scientist with Russian "roots" was A. Nobel, who founded the Nobel Foundation with money, earned in Russia. He lived and worked in St. Petersburg, and his father was a citizen of the Russian Empire. Nobel owed his success in science (the invention of dynamite) to the Russian chemist N.N. Zinin.

When Paul I adopted the Prussian uniform in the Russian army, Suvorov exclaimed: "Why? Russians have always beaten the Prussians! Why copy something that is not as good?!" This

question is still relevant today with respect to the leadership of the Ministry of Education and Science. Why copy the Western experience if Soviet education was one of the best in the world?

It looks as if it is no accident that all this is being done. We can discern the strategic scheming of the so-called shadow world government, located in the United States. Its purpose is to take the most talented young people away from Russia, the country's strategic intellectual potential. It is for this purpose that they are preparing this potential on territory that is foreign to them, providing substantial financial resources by way of nonprofit organizations, instilling their own standards of instruction, teaching them English, and then taking them away to their own territory. This kind of technology was developed by England long ago, and is still being implemented today, for example in England's former colony India. The use of this technology can also be seen in Russia. Just as in India, "tutors" are attempting to conduct instruction in English in the higher educational institutions of Russia. Today, in some educational institutions, introductory lectures are being delivered in English, and in a number of them it has been announced that in the master's program students will only be taught by instructors who know English. As is well known, in a master's program, especially in graduate school, the instruction becomes virtually personal ("one on one," to use the Western terminology). And so this category of young people (the "brains") is being "accumulated" by the West. It is for this purpose that the Mensa organization was created. It is considered an international organization, but it operates within the United States. Already it has a membership of 56,000 [7]. Naturally, implementing this "project" requires allies, collaborators (consciously, voluntarily, and deliberately collaborating with the enemy, in the interests of the enemy, to the detriment of their own country). They are easily "bought," and after that they work toward the further collapse of the country.

For them it is necessary to point out that in Russia, Western theories do not "work" in all social spheres, which attests to this country's special path. For example, the country's leaders were concerned about the health of the population and decided to

restore the prestige of Russia's sports with the help of representatives (trainers) of the Western school. It turned out that more success was achieved in the kinds of sports that retained their Russian trainers. For example, the women's biathlon team, which had always been a world leader, "stopped running and shooting accurately" after the German trainer W. Pichler was appointed. But the Russian trainers of the men's team, V.N. Pol'khovskii and A.A. Gerbulov, drawing on the traditions and experience of Russia, did not allow the level of expertise of the biathlon athletes to decline—in fact, they created a winning team.

There are other initiatives in the sphere of education that are not entirely understandable. For example, the scientific community is currently discussing the problem of streamlining certain specialties of science workers. For example, there are rumors that Specialty 22.00.08, the sociology of administration, will be taken off the list. It is well known that the higher the level of democracy, the smaller the literate population. It seems clear that there is someone who is happy about the anomie and chaos in administration, the troubled state of society, which makes it possible for people without moral or other inhibitions to steal without being punished, to move their "ill-gotten gains" into specially created offshore companies, and in Russia to build churches for the uncomplaining victims of their "wickedness" and a place to ask forgiveness for their sins, and popularize "Forgiveness Sunday." It is their opinion that the population of Russia does not need to know the technologies of administration, the formation of power, and social control. People only need to study church knowledge so as not to do harm but to forgive and to be reconciled.

It is hard to understand why the Higher Certification Commission of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation have made it so that only instructors and associates in research centers defend dissertations in dissertation councils. Naturally, while not banning but instead utilizing the well-known principle of the English strike, or the assertion that even the Sun has spots on it, unquestionably this constitutes a hidden ban on the defense of dissertations by people of other professions who would like to pass on their own experience to

the younger generation in the future. First of all, such a “recommendation” is not entirely in accord with the normative legal base, such as the Constitution of the Russian Federation (Article 43, everyone has the right to an education); with Federal Law No. 273-FZ “On Education in the Russian Federation” (Article 3, paragraph 2, on ensuring every person’s right to an education and prohibiting discrimination in the sphere of education). And if the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation are afraid of clashing with the powers that be “demanding” that they be awarded the doctor’s degree, why reduce everyone to the same level? Anyone who has the goal of defending a dissertation can “purchase” from that same bureaucrat in the system of education a reference or the formal position of instructor. In addition, there is the requirement that employers be brought in to teach in colleges and universities. What we are seeing, essentially, is one more instance of corrupted incomes of the corps of administrators of institutions of higher learning.

Second, practice shows that if an instructor (and there is a substantial majority of them) lacks experience in practical activity in the social sphere he is researching, as a rule he will not be able to achieve reliable results and work out and propose realistic, rationale, usable, and practical recommendations, such as ways to improve the management of the phenomenon being studied. As a result, it will be “armchair” scientists who make it into science. And, as is well known, theory is generalized practice. In this connection, are there any doctors of medical science who do not have practical experience in medical practice? If there are, that is a tragedy. For example, V.I. Skvortsova has been appointed minister of health of the Russian Federation. Before that, she had spent only one year as a practicing physician. Here is her “thorny path” to the minister’s chair: student—graduate student—laboratory assistant—assistant professor—associate professor—doctoral student—professor—corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences—director of a Scientific Research Institute—and Deputy Minister of Health Care and Social Development of the Russian Federation. The result is that the health care system, and society,

in its final stage of falling apart, is awash in the initiatives of this “scientist.” Having grown up in luxury, she “is unaware” that when a village woman is giving birth she needs at least a midwife (the minister closed down maternity units in Russian communities), and, having abolished the payment of fees for giving blood, she naively (?) suggests that the population is going to stand in line to give blood voluntarily. Either she does not know Russia and its vast expanses and problems, or else she is putting together a “motivation fund” for herself out of budget money.

Neither should anyone be an administrator who is a doctor or candidate of science and has never held anything except a pen but has learned how to manage from American movies or Western theories. It is worth noting that both Russian and foreign developers of the main theories of management have been practitioners. For example, A.A. Bogdanov (1873–1928) was a practicing physician (he was the organizer and director of the Blood Transfusion Institute, and he died while conducting an experiment on himself), an economist, a philosopher, a political leader, and a natural science experimenter. He formulated the theory of the general principles of organization (tectology) and anticipated a number of postulates of the theory of systems and cybernetics. The American engineer F.W. Taylor founded the scientific organization of labor and management; H. Ford, the American industrialist and owner of factories that manufactured cars for the whole world, was also a founder of the school of scientific management; H. Fayol, the French mining engineer, theoretician, and practitioner of management, was the founder of the administrative (classical) school of management.

The results of in-depth analysis of the requirements on the procedures governing the defense of dissertations show that there are also other aspects that are not entirely logical.

We can, for example, focus on the following requirement (and we will look at this in the discussion about the corrupt nature of the “requirements”): a science supervisor (and the opponents!) “must have published scientific works on a topic that relates to science administration.” The real purpose behind this provision is obvious: it is to “wear out” not only the candidate but also the

science supervisor by way of publications in journals that are reviewed by the Higher Certification Commission of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation. In this context it is appropriate to recall the “prose of life [everyday routine].” Anyone who has ever been involved in sports knows that if a person is a master of sports in some type of sport (even chess!) as a rule he will be able, without lengthy training, to confidently meet the normatives of the first category (the third category in 99 percent of cases) for most types of sports contests. A doctor of science, a professor (a master in his specialty, a master of the “analysis of problems”) is able to “understand any social problem and direct research on the problem. In addition (and how absurd!), in this case the reviewers as well, the experts on the Higher Certification Commission of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation who hand down conclusions as to the quality of dissertations, must have publications relating to the scientific works they are examining. How will they be able to “come to a conclusion” if they do not know the problem? Is such a thing possible? What if the candidate would like to work on a topic for which he is unable to find a supervisor with publications in the same sphere?

It is well known that there are [various] terms of error in any activity: “random” error and “systematic” error. The first kind is a constant companion for every individual. The only person who never makes a mistake is the person who does nothing. The mistake can easily be eliminated as soon as he begins his activity. The second error is the companion of incompetence or special intent (purpose). That kind leads to the destruction of the system.

The results of analysis of social practice make it possible to discern three main systemic errors in the management of the sphere of education, errors that make it more difficult to prevent corruption.

1. The adoption of quantitative indicators:
 - for the defenses of dissertations. For example, the activity of the dissertation councils is rated in terms of the number of defenses; in the case of graduate programs and doctoral

programs, on the number of graduate student candidates who have defended;

—the adoption of the indicator of the accreditation and licensing of higher educational institutions: “the number of permanent staff instructors who hold academic degrees and ranks”;

—the legal stipulation of requirements on allowing instructors to work in a master’s program only if they hold an academic degree and rank.

2. The decline in the level of social control over scientific activity.
3. The liberalization of articles in the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation that spell out liability for economic and other crimes. For example, as shown by an analysis of articles in the Special Part of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, a total of 145 out of about 255 articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation have been liberalized. And of that number, 32 out of the 46 articles in the section “Crimes in the Sphere of Economics” have been liberalized.?

The most significant error, one that is very difficult to eliminate and, from all appearances, is a deliberate one, is the destruction of nonformal social control.

Under Yeltsin, his team liquidated the People’s Control Committee and banned any activity by institutions of a civil society in state institutions (political parties, movements, associations, and so on). This was one of the causes of the massive plundering of the nation’s wealth, the decline in the level of all kinds of national security, including in the sphere of education.

The People’s Control Committee of the Soviet Union, which functioned with the same rights as a ministry, could submit to the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union proposals relating to problems of significance to the entire state, present reports on the way things stood in sectors of the economy and the organization of the work in the ministries and departments. Departmental,

sectoral, and production facility people's control committees issued decrees that carried mandatory legal force. The directors of enterprises and departments had to eliminate any shortcomings and violations that were brought to light and then report the results to the people's control committees. Other organizations and officials were obligated to provide assistance to people's control bodies. The People's Control Committees had the right to issue orders to eliminate shortcomings, to hear reports and accounts, to request necessary materials, to designate and conduct audits and expert appraisals, to suspend directives and actions by officials, to remove officials from their posts for failing to carry out decisions, to submit materials about abuses to procuracy bodies, to impose penalties on guilty parties, and to issue reprimands.

We would think that this kind organizational structure is very much needed today in the system of education.

Content analysis of the scientific and other literature of the past few years shows that the social experiment being conducted on the advice of the Western "classics of management" and the teachers (tutors) of current Russian "management" on getting back into the same old way once more, has been a failure on all its levels: sociocultural, political, economic, educational, demographic, social, psychological, democratic. The results of this experiment have been beneficial only to the people who think that corrupt activity is the goal and meaning of their profession.

The latest events relating to the "viscissitudes of ruling authority" have shown that there has not been anything better than the Soviet experience of management of both education and any other institution. When it began to look like "the jig was up," they reinstated the title of "Hero of Labor (laboring for the oligarch); they began to restore benefits to military service personnel, the DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy] the norms of GTO [Prepared for Work and Defense], school uniforms, college students self-government, and many other things. Clearly, after two or three more "educational" bureaucrats have been arrested, or the "receivers of educational services" have staged mass strikes, it will be time to

revert to the Soviet experience of combating corruption, formulating and defending dissertations, and ... the people's control committees will be reanimated, and the activity of various political parties will be permitted in industrial and other organizations. If not, the necessary level of order will not be assured.

And so, social practice points to the need to carry out the following measures to prevent corruption.

1. Improve the selection of cadres to serve in the system of the state's administration of education. For the purpose the following are needed:
 - organize a system to plan the selection and strategic training of the cadre reserve;
 - eliminate from social practice cases of appointing “Variangians” to positions of leadership, clan connections, the principle of team management of education, and the promotion of persons to positions of management on the party principle.
2. Restore the system of social control over education and provide incentives for its activity.
3. Not permit the adoption and implementation of legally binding statutory instruments without discussing and evaluating them to check for corruption.
4. Provide for the regular rotation of management cadres.
5. Halt and “reverse” the process of liberalization of articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation that relate to liability for economic and other crimes.

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